INTRODUCTION
1 in Bonn and Marrakesh?" The main purpose of this paper is therefore to quantify and analyse the repercussions of first, the US withdrawal and secondly, the COP 6 Bis and COP 7 agreements on global carbon emissions and on the total amount and distribution of compliance costs.
First, concerning the withdrawal of the USA, it is well known that the USA has been, and still is, the major emitter of greenhouse gases among the Annex B countries, accounting for approximately 38%
of total Annex B emissions in 1995. The US withdrawal therefore means that the world emission reduction objective is being weakened considerably. We thus expect a drastic fall of permit price and a significant decrease of the compliance costs for the other Annex B Parties of the Kyoto Protocol.
Secondly, the Bonn and Marrakesh accords cover mainly four topics: the use of Kyoto flexible mechanisms, the use of carbon sinks, funding provisions and compliance issues 2 . On the first topic, the Kyoto mechanisms and supplementarity issue, it has been agreed to put no cap on the use of the flexible mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto Protocol. Domestic actions should just constitute a "significant element" of the effort made by the Parties. It has also been agreed that each Party has to keep some specified amount of Assigned Amount Units (AAU) in its greenhouse gases account. This provision is called the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR) and is intended to limit the risk of permit overselling.
On the second topic, carbon sinks, rigorous definitions of concepts like afforestation, reforestation etc. Finally, a compliance committee has been created and one has agreed upon a non-binding obligation that says that excess emissions of a Party at the end of the first commitment period have to be compensated (augmented by 30%) during the following commitment period.
We will not deal in our analysis with all these four issues negotiated in Bonn and Marrakesh. Some of them are simply not quantifiable and others, like the 30% supplementary reduction to be done in case of non-compliance, would require information on the second commitment period. We rather concentrate on two major issues. The first issue is the use of carbon sinks. This issue is very much debated as there is no easy way to measure the carbon sequestered by changes in vegetation. Hence, there is a fear that emission credits obtained via these sinks are not real reductions and will not help to combat climate change. We approximate the repercussions of the use of carbon sinks on the Annex B permit market equilibrium and on the abatement efforts of the different Parties by assuming that land use changes and forestry activities constitute free carbon abatement options. Hence, we assumed that countries will try as much as possible to use existing projects without additional costs to be certified as carbon sink projects which can be used to meet their emission reduction obligation.
The second issue is the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR). Many signatories fear that, if no
restrictions are put on permit sales, Russia and Ukraine would be tempted to sell large amounts of emission permits during the early years of the first commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) and will be found in non-compliance afterwards. The CPR mechanism tries to prevent this by requiring all permit exporters to maintain a certain number of permits in their accounts during the first commitment period. Hence, the CPR mechanism is similar to a (temporary) ceiling on permit exports and can be expected to have similar effects on the equilibrium permit price and on the costs of the different trading partners (see among others, Haites and Missfeldt (2001) , Criqui et al. (1999) , Ellerman and Wing (2000) or Eyckmans and Cornillie (2001) ). Hence, this issue will be dealt in conjunction with those of restrictions on hot air, strategic behaviour and emissions abatement via Joint Implementation in countries from Eastern Europe.
In terms of methodology, we use in this paper the MacGEM model in order to quantify the repercussions of the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and of the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements. MacGEM consists of a set of marginal abatement cost functions for carbon emissions originating from fossil fuel use. The model aims at evaluating compliance costs and permit trading equilibria for the first commitment period of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC. The approach is similar to Ellerman and Decaux (1998) and Criqui et al. (1999) . Emission trading equilibria are computed by seeking a price for which total market excess permit supply is zero.
Excess supply of every of the 15 world regions/countries in the model depends upon its marginal abatement cost function and assigned amount of emissions. The marginal abatement cost functions are estimated on data generated with the GEM-E3-World general equilibrium model (for detailed descriptions of GEM-E3-World, see Capros et al. (1997 and . MacGEM also allows for the introduction of trading restrictions like for instance a Commitment Period Reserve (CPR, see further), transaction costs and limited accessibility of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms like Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the reference scenario. This reference scenario represents the 'original' Kyoto Protocol as it assumes the participation of the USA and does not include the CPR nor does it account for sinks. Section 3 examines the effects of the US withdrawal on the world emissions reduction objective and on the effort to be done by each Party. In section 4, we approximate the net changes in carbon sinks that might be used by the Parties to meet their emission reduction objective. Section 5 emphasises the key role of Russia and Ukraine on the market and discusses the consequences of strategic behaviour by these countries under different scenarios including the CPR mechanism. Sensitivity analysis is reported in section 6. It bears on the efficiency of the domestic emission reductions, on the countries emissions baselines and on the use of the clean development mechanism. Finally, section 7 summarises our results and concludes.
MODEL STRUCTURE AND REFERENCE SCENARIO

MacGEM model structure
MacGEM is a numerical simulation model that aims at evaluating carbon emission abatement and permit trading equilibria for the first Commitment Period (i.e. 2008 Period (i.e. -2012 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.
The model distinguishes between 15 main regions/countries in the world and allows for simulating the effects of the flexible mechanisms provided for in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Joint Implementation JI, Clean Development Mechanism CDM and International Emission Trading IET). The core of the model consists of a set of marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions that were derived from simulations with the GEM-E3-WORLD general equilibrium model (see Capros et al. (1997 and . The MAC functions used in the main part of this paper were calculated under the assumption that emission abatement is allocated efficiently at the national level over the different economic sectors, i.e. marginal abatement costs are equalised across all sectors in every country, without distributional consideration.
Implicitly, we also assume that the allocation of abatement efforts between the countries has no effect on the MAC function of an individual country 3 .
The GDP in 2010 of country i is defined as ( ) Actual emissions in 2010 are defined as 2010 BAU emissions minus abatement: emissions with i R tons by 2010. These losses include, among others, the costs of fuel switching, the cost of investing in more efficient technologies, insulation costs to increase fuel efficiency in private houses and buildings etc. Since the MAC functions were estimated on data generated by a general equilibrium model, our approach incorporates indirect or general equilibrium effects. In this respect, our approach is the same as the one of Ellerman and Decaux (1998) who are using MAC functions that are estimated on data generated by the MIT-EPPA general equilibrium model or Criqui et al (1999) who are using partial equilibrium POLES data. The cost function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing ( 
A market for carbon emission permits is created by assigning emission targets (Assigned Amount Units i AAU ) to every region and allowing them to trade emission reductions. The possibility of permit trading affects a country's GDP in the following way:
Every country can choose between reducing its emissions more than required by the quotum i AAU and selling the surplus in the permit market at unit price p , or reducing its emissions less than required and buying additional permits in the international market. Assuming price taking behaviour and ignoring constraints on the trading volumes 4 , a free trade market equilibrium for permit trading is defined as a vector of emission reduction efforts such that every individual country maximises its expected GDP in 2010. The first-order necessary and sufficient condition for this maximisation problem says that every country should reduce its carbon emissions up to the point where its marginal abatement cost is exactly equal to the market price 5 .
( )
These first-order conditions define well-behaved, continuous and increasing emission reduction supply curves:
C′ is strictly monotone, continuous and strictly increasing in abatement. Excess supply for permits is defined as follows:
4
Of course, some natural limits apply to the amount of emission reduction feasible. Emission abatement (relative to some Business-as-Usual scenario) is restricted to be nonnegative and cannot exceed the BAU emissions:
Because of the assumptions on the limit behaviour of the marginal abatement cost functions we need not consider corner solutions. ( )
The excess supply framework can easily be extended to account for transaction costs and limited accessibility for, e.g. CDM and/or JI projects, by altering the reduction supply functions as follows:
where α denotes the accessibility rate (for instance 30%) and β the proportional transaction cost (for instance 20%) that is incurred when implementing a bilateral JI or CDM project.
Reference scenario: the 1997 Kyoto Agreement
Since we want to compare the recent Bonn and Marrakesh agreements with the original Kyoto Protocol, we first have to define what we mean exactly with the Kyoto Protocol. For the Kyoto reference scenario we made the following assumptions:
• the USA are participating in the agreement
• Annex B countries engage in unrestricted permit trading among each other
• "hot air" (i.e. if
) is allowed to be traded without restrictions
• CDM accessibility is limited to 30% and CDM transaction costs amount to 20%
The limited accessibility of CDM means that only 30% of projects eligible for CDM and which would have been realised given the international permit/credit price, are actually carried out because of practical, legal and administrative reasons. The transaction costs, which complement this limited accessibility, are a cost for the host countries 7 .
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Existence of a unique free trade market equilibrium is always guaranteed for
≤ ∑ ∑ because of the limit assumptions on the marginal abatement cost functions. The inequality in the market equilibrium condition refers to the case in which total permit supply would be larger than the sum of all AAUs in equilibrium (for instance if there would be more "hot air" than total reduction obligations) which implies that carbon permits have no value, i.e. the equilibrium price is zero.
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We follow here the approach chosen by Criqui (2000) and Manne and Richels (2001) who use similar numbers for CDM accessibility. Note that the 2% share of proceeds on CDM projects that has been agreed in Bonn (see UNFCCC (2001c) , p.18) is assumed to be embodied in the accessibility and transaction costs factors.
The following Table shows the main features of the reference scenario. • The name and the composition of the regions and countries are provided in appendix (see Table A .1); Annex B* includes all Annex B countries except USA and CEU.
• E denotes 2010 emissions (in GtCO2)
• ∆E/E0 denotes the change in emissions between 2010 and 1990, divided by 1990 emissions (in percentage)
• XS/AAU denotes excess supply for permit (exports (+) or imports (-)) as a fraction of Kyoto target emissions or Assigned Amount Units AAU (in percentage)
• MAC denotes marginal carbon abatement cost (in $1995 per ton of CO2)
• AC stands for the abatement cost (in percentage of 2010 GDP)
• PC stands for the permit costs, i.e. the equilibrium permit price times the volume of permits imported or exported (in percentage of 2010 GDP)
• TC denotes total costs, i. 
THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF THE USA
By now it has become clear that the USA will not observe the emission target it had been assigned in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In July of this year, the remaining Parties of the Kyoto Protocol decided during COP 6 bis to pursue the implementation of the Protocol in spite of the nonparticipation of one of the most important carbon emitting Parties. As depicted in Figure 3 .1, the nonparticipation of the USA changes things significantly. First, global carbon emissions in 2010 increase by almost 25% instead of 15.5% w.r.t. 1990 emission levels (see Table A .3 in appendix for detailed figures). Compared to the emissions increase under the BAU scenario, which amounts to 30.1% (see Table A .2 in appendix), the global emission reduction objective is drastically weakened by the US withdrawal. Secondly, and consequently, the price of the permits decreases by more than 50% (10.03 versus 21.96 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 ) since an important share of permit demand falls out. As the world total emissions objective falls, it is not surprising to observe that compliance costs for the Annex-B* countries (EU15, OEU, AUZ, JAP and CAN, i.e. countries with real emission reduction objectives) decrease by a factor of 2 (see Figure 3 .1, for detailed figures, see Table A .3 in appendix). Because of the sharp reduction in the equilibrium permit price, all permit exporting countries lose from the nonparticipation by the US.
The biggest looser in absolute terms is CEU whose benefits decrease from 2.113% to 0.819% of GDP in 2010. Permit sales revenues of CDM hosting countries are even cut by a factor four. At the same time, world total costs decrease drastically, from 0.058 % to 0.008 % of 2010 GDP.
For comparison, Böhringer (2001) reports equilibrium carbon prices of 16.9 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 when US participates and only 1.9 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 when it does not for the original Kyoto emission reduction targets. We will come back to this comparison later.
SINKS
The general principle that net changes in carbon sinks can be used by Annex B countries to meet their greenhouse gas emission reduction commitment was already accepted in the Kyoto Protocol (in particular the Articles 3.3 and 3.4). However, the precise definitions of carbon sinks and the way to account for them has been one of the major discussion points during CoP 6 (The Hague), CoP 6 Bis (Bonn) and COP 7 (Marrakesh). In the final documents issued by the Bonn and Marrakesh meetings (see FCCC (2001a,d) ), different kinds of land use, land use changes and forestry (LULUCF) activities which result in net changes in carbon sinks are distinguished. Each of these activities is subject to different rules and constraints. In the following section we summarise the essentials.
Activities that give rise to changes in carbon sinks
It is important to distinguish activities that fall under Article 3. 
Sinks in CDM projects (Article 12 of Kyoto Protocol)
For CDM projects, things are relatively clear and simple. In the framework of CDM projects, the only LULUCF activities that can give rise to net additions to the donor country's assigned amount of greenhouse gases are afforestation and reforestation. However, the net total of these LULUCF activities under CDM projects should not exceed one percent of the donor country's base year (i.e.
1990 for most parties) emissions.
Sinks in the MACGEM model: a first approximation
As comprehensive data on carbon sinks and costs of LULUCF activities are rare and not reliable, we adopted a rough approximation by assuming that all Parties will use sinks in CDM projects and forest management activities up to the maximal levels specified by the Bonn agreement and that this represents a zero cost abatement option. This is clearly a strong assumption since converting agricultural land into forest has an important opportunity cost (loss of agricultural production) for instance. Still we believe that Parties will try as much as possible to get their current and planned LULUCF activities recognised as carbon sink credits. These projects can be considered as zero cost greenhouse gas abatement options since they will be undertaken anyway (for instance in the case of commercial forestry projects because they are expected to generate future profits, or in the case of nature conservation, because the expected recreational and existence value are estimated higher than the opportunity cost of the land).
One might argue that our assumption that sinks are zero cost abatement opportunities, is unrealistic and overestimates the role of sinks in the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements. However, we believe that
Parties will try as much as possible to use these carbon sinks provisions to limit their compliance costs.
Moreover, and in contrast to our simulations, the Bonn-Marrakesh accords do not cap all LULUCF activities. In partiuclar, there exist several other low cost LULUCF activities (e.g. grazing land management etc) which will, beyond doubt, be used by Parties to obtain emission credits. 
COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR, THE COMMITMENT PERIOD RESERVE AND HOT AIR
As mentioned in the above sections, Central and Eastern European countries CEU play a key role in the determination of abatement efforts since (i) their AAU are larger than their 2010 BAU emissions (hence they possess so called "hot air") and (ii) they are the only permit exporters among Annex-B
countries. This raises several issues that are linked to the Commitment Period Reserve provision negotiated in Bonn and which we deal with in three steps.
Firstly in section 5.1, we analyse the impact of strategic restrictions of permits exports by CEU and
show that the Commitment Period Reserve may be interpreted as a step towards such a strategic behaviour. For that purpose, we assume that CEU is free to sell first all the permits which entail the lowest abatement costs. As depicted in Figure 5 .1 (scenario "5.1"), CEU will sell first its permits from hot air as these permits do not imply any abatement costs. If all hot air is sold and if sales restrictions have not been reached yet, CEU will start selling permits that correspond to costly emission reduction projects. For any binding permit export restriction, the marginal abatement cost of CEU will therefore lie below the market price of carbon. At the prevailing price, CEU would like to sell more permits but is prevented from doing so by the export ceiling.
Secondly, restrictions on the sales of hot air have been very much debated because this hot air does not correspond to genuine abatement of emissions. We evaluate in section 5.2 the effect of different restrictions on the sale of hot air by assuming that real emission reductions take place up to equalisation of CEU marginal abatement cost to the international price of carbon. Hence, we assume that CEU does not restricts its sales of real emission reductions as depicted in Figure 5 .1 (scenario "5.2").
Thirdly in section 5.3, we conjecture that CEU might not themselves implement domestic policies aiming at reducing emissions and that CEU domestic abatement may only come from Joint Implementation (JI) projects. In this scenario, genuine emission reductions will take place but to a lower extent than in the previous scenario because JI does not perform as well as emissions trading (see Figure 5 .1, scenario "5.3"). This is accounted for by introducing a JI accessibility factor, which drives a wedge between the equilibrium permit price and CEUs marginal abatement cost. In this third scenario, we will also analyse the consequences of a possible limit on CEUs sales of hot air. 
Strategic behaviour by CEU and the Commitment Period Reserve
Restrictions on permit exports by CEU
As CEU are the only countries which are expected to export AAU in the Kyoto carbon permit market, a restriction on their exports is likely to affect the price of the permits and, consequently, the total compliance costs of every country. In order to analyse this issue, we compute the total abatement cost (relative to GDP) for some selected regions including CEU and the equilibrium permit price for different levels of restrictions on CEU permits exports. As mentioned above, we assume that CEU sells first the emission reductions which entail the lowest costs. Practically, it means that CEU will sell its hot air before turning to genuine emission reductions. If the export restriction is binding, we therefore expect the marginal abatement cost of CEU to be lower than the one of the Annex-B* countries.
The export restriction is introduced in MacGEM by modifying expression (3) for excess permit supply:
where i L stands for the export limit and
As depicted in Figure 5 .2, CEU can exert considerable market power by restricting its permit export. If CEU exports are fully restricted, the equilibrium permit price reaches 34.46 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 . The equilibrium price progressively decreases and stabilises at 5.38 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 when the export constraint becomes non binding. This occurs at an export limit of about 30% of CEUs AAU. We observe that CEU maximises its gains by selling only 15% of its AAU, which corresponds approximately to its hot air 11 . It would therefore be optimal for CEU to sell exactly all its hot air and not to engage in any additional costly emission reduction. It should however be noted that the overall magnitude of CEUs monopoly gains is relatively small. Furthermore, both trade gains of the CDM regions and compliance costs of permit importing regions increase monotonically because of the increasing permit price. we will come back to this issue of CEU baseline projections.
The CPR: a step towards strategic behaviour
The goal of the commitment period reserve (CPR) is to prevent the risk of overselling of emission permits by Parties by requiring each of them to maintain a certain amount of permits in their account.
According to the negotiation text, the CPR is defined as follows Therefore, if all countries comply, the CPR works as a (temporary) constraint on the sales-the exports-of permits during the commitment period (see Baron (2001) and Haites and Missfeldt (2001) for a detailed description and analysis of the CPR) Table A .4).
Hence, CEU would like to sell more permits but is prevented from doing so by the CPR mechanism.
In Figure 5 .2, the vertical dotted line indicates the 22% export restriction induced by the CPR mechanism under option [b] 15
. In this situation, CEU permit trading gains rise by about 45% compared to a situation without export restrictions (compare Table A.5 and Table A .4 in appendix for detailed figures). However, as suggested before, CEU would maximise its gains by restricting its supply of permits even more: a CPR of 85% (corresponding to an export restriction of 15%) would be optimal from the CEU's point of view. If the CPR becomes higher than 94%, CEU starts loosing compared to the unrestricted scenario because the effect of the export ceiling dominates the price effect.
We can conclude that the CPR mechanism is not a bad deal for CEU as its permit trading gains increase. However, CEU countries could do even better by behaving strategically and restricting its sales of permits even further.
Restrictions on Hot Air
As CEU are the only countries which export AAU, a restriction on their exports is likely to affect the price of the permits and, consequently, compliance costs of every country. In order to analyse this issue, we compute in Figure 5 .3 the total abatement cost (relative to GDP) for some selected regions including CEU and the equilibrium permit price for different levels of hot air exports. Whatever this restriction on hot air sales, it is assumed that CEU reduces its emissions up to equalisation of its marginal abatement costs to the permits price In case of full restriction on hot air sales (0% of AAU), the permits price is 14.00 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 . When all hot air is allowed to be exported (15.3% of AAU), the price reaches its level of 5.38 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 . In the former case, total compliance costs for Annex-B* countries are two times higher than in the latter case.
The intuition for this cost increase is that more costly abatement projects have to be undertaken when hot air sales are forbidden in order to satisfy the Kyoto commitments. When no hot air is sold, global carbon emissions are lower and amount to 26.63 GtCO 2 rather than 27.33 GtCO 2 . Note also that nonAnnex-B countries, like China and India, benefit very much from a restriction on the sale of hot air.
Their gains increase by a factor of, respectively, 4 and 3 since the demand of permits by Annex-B* countries shifts towards CDM credits as a result of the lower permits supply by CEU. 16 This analysis may also serve as a very rough assessment of the "environmental reinvestment proposal" put forward by CEU at COP6. These countries propose to reinvest the revenues from sales of hot air into special projects that reduce the same amount of emissions as those sold (see for a detailed presentation of the proposal). It means that if permits are sold, they schould correspond to genuine emission reductions. In our model, the reinvestment proposal (if applied in this form) would therefore correspond to a situation of full restriction of hot air sales.
Restrictions on hot air and a conjecture: Joint Implementation rather than domestic policies in CEU
Up to now we have assumed that emission reductions in CEU take place via domestic measures such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax. These measures allow CEU to produce genuine emission abatement and to sell more permits than the difference between its AAU and its business-as-usual emissions, i.e., to sell more than its hot air. However, we believe that CEU may not have the capacity, or may not be willing, to implement such domestic instruments during the first commitment period.
Rather, the only emission reductions taking place in CEU could be realized via Joint Implementation projects (Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol) set up and financed by other Annex B countries. The emission reduction units (ERUs) obtained under these projects would be used by these importers to meet their reduction commitment and would automatically be deduced from CEUs permit account.
In the present subsection, we consider a rather extreme case where CEU does not engage in any domestic action to reduce its emissions. Emission reductions in CEU only take place via Joint Implementation projects. In this scenario, CEU would still be free to sell all or only part of its hot air. We therefore consider that CEU exerts market power, but only by means of its hot air. As it has been done for CDM projects, we introduce a JI accessibility factor which accounts for the impossibility to carry all profitable and eligible projects. In the simulations described below, we choose an accessibility factor of 60%
17
. A sensitivity analysis on this JI accessibility factor is performed because on the one hand, the value of this parameter is highly conjectural, and, on the other hand, CEU may take administrative or legal rules which either favour or discourage JI on its territory.
CEUs behaviour can then be described as choosing the amount of hot air to be sold, CEU H , such that its net costs of abatement and permit demand are minimised: 
with γ being the accessibility factor of JI projects in CEU.
The detailed results are presented in appendix (see Table A A first observation is that the CPR is not binding. CEU only exports 16% of its AAU: 8% are exports of ERUs (i.e., emission reductions which stem from JI projects) and 8% are from hot air sales
18
. As CEU only sells 55% of its hot air (0.373 GtCO 2 ), this has an influence on the CO 2 emissions of these countries, and thus also on the world emissions which increase by 23.57% w.r.t. their 1990 level (26.80% in the case of US non participation and with sinks). A second observation is that the total costs are higher than in the scenario without USA and with sinks (see Figure 5 .4b). This increase in not only due to the market power of CEU, but also-and mainly-to 18 The Bonn agreement stipulates that exports of ERUs are not subject to the CPR (see UNFCCC (2001 c), p14, §38). Therefore, only the hot air exports (8% of AAU) are subject to the CPR. The latter is thus a fortiori satisfied. However, exports from sinks absorption activities should also be taken into account, but this does not lead the CPR to be binding since these activities only account for 4.2% of CEU AAU.
the restricted accessibility of JI. At the same time, the price increases from 5.38 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 to 14.80 $ 1995 /tonCO 2 . A sensitivity analysis on the JI accessibility factor is presented in Table 5 .1. With a JI accessibility factor of 90%, CEU minimises its costs by selling 50% of its hot air. When the accessibility factor goes down to 30%, CEU sells 74% of hot air. In each case, the CPR is satisfied. From this we observe that CEU might find profitable to discourage JI projects in their region, if possible. Its gains are indeed slightly higher when the JI accessibility factor equals 30%. The reason is that CEU benefits from restricting its total exports of permits (as it increases the price). Then, for a given limit on exports, the lower the JI accessibility, the higher the amount of hot air that can be sold and therefore the lower the reductions, that is the abatement costs, for CEU. However, world emissions are higher with a low JI accessibility factor as more hot air is sold.
SENSITIVITY
In this final section, we illustrate the sensitivity of our simulation results w.r.t. the basic parameters and assumptions. As a central case, we assume non-participation of the USA, inclusion of sinks and introduction of the Commitment Period Reserve
19
. In particular we will investigate the effect of:
• an increase in the cost estimates resulting from imperfect domestic policies in Annex-B countries
• a change in the 2010 baseline emissions
• more flexible implementation of CDM projects
Imperfect domestic policies in Annex-B countries
Up to now, we have been working with a set of marginal abatement cost functions derived from the GEM-E3-World model under optimistic assumptions W.r.t. the efficiency of domestic carbon reduction measures. In particular, it was assumed that all regions implement their abatement policy by choosing a cost efficient allocation of reduction efforts over the 18 different sectors in the GEM-E3-World model.
For instance, they achieve the target by setting a uniform carbon tax in all sectors (without exception!)
or by allowing for unrestricted permit trading.
However, full cost efficiency is rarely achieved in environmental policy making, for instance because some sectors are exempted from the carbon tax or because of transaction costs. We therefore estimated an alternative set of marginal abatement cost functions that incorporate some degree of inefficiency in the national implementation of reduction efforts. We assumed that within every region 5 isolated clubs of sectors can be distinguished: energy sector, energy intensive sector, other industries, services, and households. The national authority allocates uniformly its emission abatement target (x% abatement w.r.t. 1990 emission levels) over the five sector clubs but within each club, abatement efforts can be reallocated in order to achieve equalisation of marginal abatement costs. Hence, we assume that within every region, marginal abatement costs are equalised only partially. Only within the clubs, marginal abatement costs are equal, across clubs and countries, they can differ 20 .
We used this new set of MAC functions only for Annex B countries since the for the non-Annex B regions, accessibility constraints and transaction costs of CDM projects already incorporate a certain degree of local inefficiency. Results are shown in Figure 6 .1. 
Lower baseline emissions for 2010
Baseline emissions estimates are based on numerous assumptions concerning GDP growth rate, rate of technological progress etc. The uncertainty on each of these parameters is compounded in the final baseline emission estimate. We therefore present a simulation in which all regions baseline emissions are lower by 5% (E2010 = 0.95 E2010) compared to the central case
21
. Though there is little reason to believe that uncertainty would affect all regions in the same way, we have chosen this counterfactual scenario to illustrate the strong sensitivity of the simulation model for baseline emission data. 
Higher accessibility and lower transaction costs for CDM
Finally we look at the effect of higher accessibility (60% instead of 30%) and lower transaction costs (10% instead of 20%) for CDM projects compared to the central case. Figure 6 .3 shows that the 21 We also decrease baseline emissions in 2005 by the same factor. This might affect the level of the CPR whenever CEU chooses option [b] (see section 5.1).
equilibrium permit price and compliance costs would fall sharply when CDM projects become easier and cheaper to implement. The introduction of activities enhancing carbon sinks should in principle not modify world net-CO 2 emissions since the discounts on emission reduction obligations are, in priciple, compensated by the uptake of CO 2 by sinks. Although this issue is being very much debated, it is clear that the introduction of such activities leads to a further decrease of carbon emission abatement efforts. Given the nonparticipation of the US, our results show that accounting for carbon sinks enhancement activities will lead to a further decrease of Annex-B* total costs by more than 45% (55% and 60% for CAN and AUZ respectively). Another element of the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements, the commitment period reserve (CPR), plays in an opposite direction. On the one hand, our analysis suggests that the CPR has been well designed in the sense that it limits as much as possible the risk of overselling while not imposing further costs to CEU. On the other hand, it also emphasises the central role played by CEU, particularly when the accessibility to emission reductions in non-Annex B countries via CDM projects is low. In this case, CEU has ample opportunities to behave strategically either by applying the CPR rule strictly or by restricting its sales of permits. This causes an increase in the permit price of about 50% and, as a consequence, of the compliance costs (about 55% for all Annex B* countries taken together). This effect continues to play but is weakened if we assume that emission reductions can only take place via JI projects in CEU. Thought the market power effect is relatively small compared to the consequences of the US withdrawal and the inclusion of sinks, our simulations suggest to pay attention to the market behaviour and to the way emission reductions take place in the CEU countries.
Our analysis also suggests that these results are very sensitive to the performance of domestic Protocol GHG abatement target for the first commitment period. The nonparticipation of the USA plus the rather generous way in which sinks can be used to meet one's reduction commitment, indeed cause the Kyoto Protocol to become "fatally flawed". However, together with many others like for instance Grubb and Depledge (2001) , we believe that this negative conclusion should not be interpreted as the death of the international climate negotiations. It is important to recall the status of the Kyoto Protocol, it is only one of the instruments of implementation of the more general and ambitious 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC. Therefore we believe that the Bonn-Marrakesh agreements have the merit to save this international negotiation framework, even if the first step (the Kyoto Protocol) will bring about only very little reduction in GHG emissions. The UNFCCC foresees that talks should start soon on quantified emission reduction targets for the second commitment period (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) . In our opinion, the international climate negotiators face the challenge to persuade some of the big developing countries to commit to quantified emission reductions for the future. This might create the appropriate conditions for making the USA reconsider its position and for meeting the ultimate long term goal of the UNFCCC, i.e. to stabilise GHG emissions at a level to prevent irreversible damage to natural and human ecosystems.
Our analysis is incomplete as not all elements of the Bonn and Marrakesh agreements have been analysed, notably because some of them are of a qualitative nature. However, the 30% supplementary reductions to be done in case of non compliance during the first commitment period is likely to have a significant impact on emission reductions and on abatement efforts, as well as on the enforcement of the Protocol. Indeed, anticipating a decrease in the permit price at the second commitment period by, for instance, putting high hopes in the development of low cost abatement technologies, some countries might choose not to comply in the first commitment period and rather bear the 30% discount
penalty. An excessive use of this rule could then jeopardise the credibility on the enforcement.
Moreover, delaying emission reduction efforts has a non-negligible impact on future climate.
Conversely, since our analysis has shown that the first commitment period abatement objectives are flawed and that the permit price will be relatively low, countries might rather choose to bank permits in order to use them in the second commitment period. Determining whether countries will not comply and pay de 30% penalty or rather bank permits requires the conversion of the static MacGEM model into a dynamic one. Various second commitment period emission reduction objectives will then need to be considered.
The GEM-E3 model has been frequently used in the past by the project partners for policy-oriented research activities for National Authorities and for Directorate Generals of the European Commission.
The multi-purpose nature of GEM-E3 (national, EU-wide, world wide applications, endogenous innovation, alternative assumptions about expectations of agents, new instruments etc.) makes it an appropriate tool for the evaluation of policies in many domains, also outside energy and environment.
GEM-E3 provides details on the macro-economy of the 18 World regions and its interaction with the environment and the energy system. GEM-E3 is a dynamic, recursive over time, model, involving dynamics of capital accumulation and technology progress, stock and flow relationships and backward looking expectations. A more detailed description of MacGEM can be found in Capros et al. (1997 and .
MacGEM
MacGEM is a global marginal abatement cost simulation model. 
Marginal abatement cost MAC functions
The core of the MacGEM model is given by a set of marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions that were derived from simulations with the global GEM-E3-WORLD general equilibrium model under different hypothesis concerning the national allocation of abatement targets or permits. The cost functions used for the simulations in the main part of the paper were calculated under the assumption that emission abatement is allocated efficiently at the national level over the different economic sectors, i.e. marginal abatement costs are equalized across all sectors in every country.
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